On the road to Bali: operationalising the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund by unknown
O P I N I O N
Sustainable Development
Published by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)
in association with  
european capacity building initiative (ecbi)
International
Institute for
Environment and
Development
On the road to Bali:
operationalising the Kyoto Protocol 
Adaptation Fund
 Enele Sopoaga (Tuvalu),  Lydia Greyling (South Africa), David Lesolle (Botswana), Emily Massawa (Kenya), José Miguez (Brazil)1,2
20
07
•
The Adaptation Fund was created under 
the Kyoto Protocol to support adaptation 
measures on the ground, particularly in 
very vulnerable countries. It is unique 
both in the way it is financed and in the 
potential scale of money generated. As 
such, we believe it will be best served 
with a ‘stand-alone’ operating entity and 
a decision-making format that genuinely 
guarantees the authority of the Protocol’s 
Meeting of Parties over the Fund. This may 
mean a delay in setting up and running 
the Fund – but given the importance of 
getting its governance and management 
right, we feel this is an acceptable risk.
A new kind of funding mechanism
The Adaptation Fund (AF) was discussed 
at the first Meeting of Parties of the Kyoto 
Protocol (COP/MOP1) in Montreal in 
2005, and again at COP/MOP2 in Nairobi 
a year later. In Nairobi it was agreed in 
Decision 5/CMP2 that ‘the Adaptation 
Fund should operate under the authority 
and guidance of and be accountable to 
the COP/MOP [Art 1(e)], and that the 
membership of the governing body of the 
Adaptation Fund shall:
(i)   be from Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
(ii)  follow a one-country-one-vote rule and
(iii) have a majority of Parties not included 
in Annex I to the Convention’. [Article 3]
KEY MESSAGES: 
The Adaptation Fund of the 
Kyoto Protocol is a unique 
financing mechanism based 
on an international levy 
on mainly private sector 
projects under the Clean 
Development Mechanism.  
The Fund could potentially 
dwarf bilateral donations and 
become the main conduit for 
adaptation funding.  
The Fund will be best 
served with a ‘stand-alone’ 
governance and management 
structure featuring a new 
tailor-made expert executive 
body and a decision-making 
format that ensures the 
authority of the COP/MOP.  
While it would be ideal 
to set up such a structure 
without delay, speed is less 
important than getting the 
governance right, to achieve 
the purpose of the Fund.
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The AF is unique and, as such, its 
governance and management merit 
particular attention. Unlike the other UN 
climate change funds3,  the AF does not 
rely exclusively on voluntary donations 
from industrialised countries. Instead it is 
currently envisaged that it will be funded 
mainly through an ‘adaptation levy’ on the 
credits generated by Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects carried out 
primarily by the private sector of both 
developed and developing countries.  
The 2 per cent levy is collected directly 
by an international body — the CDM 
Executive Board — and transferred to the 
AF for monetisation. 
The adaptation levy is thus akin to an 
international tax on certain worldwide 
private sector activities. Because it does 
not flow through national treasuries, 
the money raised will by definition be 
additional to any Official Development 
Assistance (ODA).  As the first instance 
of innovative international adaptation 
funding, it could potentially dwarf the 
amounts of money likely to be made 
available for adaptation through  
bilateral donations.
Moreover, there are other avenues of 
innovative funding for the AF that could 
and should be pursued — not least if the 
expected gap in adaptation funding is to 
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be filled. These include an extension of the adaptation levy 
to the other mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (possibly at a 
higher rate), and the inclusion of bunker fuel-based emitting 
activities, such as air and maritime travel.
This is why we are not convinced by the two main arguments 
put forward for operating the AF by the same entity as 
the other two UNFCCC funds — namely, that this would 
eliminate significant duplications in adaptation activities 
under the different funds, and prevent the unnecessary 
creation of a new body. We believe that the AF is in a 
league of its own, and that it is sufficiently different from 
the other funds to necessitate the creation of a ‘stand-alone’ 
governance structure with an entirely new operating body.
Guaranteeing COP/MOP authority 
The initial decision on the relation between the COP/MOP 
and the AF taken at Montreal was revisited at the very 
next session to assert the authority of the COP/MOP over 
the AF. This was a key assertion, not merely a redundant 
stylistic reformulation of the initial decision, and it must be 
adequately reflected in the governance structure of the AF. 
We believe this means, at the very least, that the COP/MOP 
has ultimate authority over strategic decisions taken by 
the AF executive body, and that these decisions should be 
subject to approval by the COP/MOP. There are a number of 
features that would help to ensure this:
Parties to the COP/MOP – which itself has to be 
explicitly designated as the voting constituency for the 
AF – must also be given the right to demand a vote on 
strategic decisions of the AF executive body.
The COP/MOP decides which type of decisions by the 
executive body are strategic.
Strategic decisions, once taken, must be ratified by the 
COP/MOP.
The AF executive body must be responsible for making 
available information relevant to its decisions in a timely 
and transparent manner, in particular to the UNFCCC 
focal points.
Operating the Fund
To avoid conflicts with the COP/MOP’s overall political 
authority, and at the same time to ensure competence and 
avoid undue political interference, we propose that the AF 
executive body be made up of financial and adaptation 
experts. These will be chosen by the COP/MOP and operate 
in their personal capacity and in strict adherence with  
Article 3 of the Nairobi Decision. 
We think that this kind of ‘stand-alone’ operating entity can 
be successful, as the Montreal Protocol Fund has amply 
demonstrated. The expert model also has a proven track 
record: it is used in the world’s most influential financial 
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1 This opinion piece is based on a presentation by Enele Sopoaga on behalf 
of the Oxford Fellows to European colleagues during the 2007 ecbi Oxford 
Seminar (5-7 September). All authors are ecbi Fellows or Experts. For more 
on the ecbi see www.EuroCapacity.org.
2 The views expressed in this article are the authors’ personal views and 
do not necessarily reflect those of either their respective countries or 
negotiating Groups.
3 The Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change 
Fund.
4 At the time of writing, the AF holding account contained 1.6 million 
CERs (see http://cdm.unfccc.int), which even under the most optimistic 
assumptions would not raise more than €32 million.
systems, in bodies such as the Board of Governors of the 
US Federal Reserve System, the Board of Directors of the 
European Central Bank, and the Monetary Policy Committee 
of the Bank of England.
We also believe that – apart from the non-Annex I majority 
mandated in the Nairobi Decision – the executive body 
should be made up of members reflecting not only the 
UN regions, but also the main interest groups: the most 
vulnerable countries, including the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), 
as the intended recipients, and the largest CDM investors, 
representing the main source of funding. The key, as 
mentioned above, is that all the members of the executive 
body would be sitting in their expert capacity and not as 
government representatives. 
The day-to-day running of the AF could then be delegated  
to a Secretariat, either housed within an existing organisation 
or even set up as a separate entity. This structure is essential 
for achieving the broad political acceptance of this key 
climate change fund and we believe it is worth investing  
the time needed to get it right, particularly since the value  
of the credits collected through the adaptation levy to date  
is still negligible4.
